Abstract: We propose several practical SMC protocols for privacy-preserving cooperative scientific computations. We consider two important scientific computations which involve linear equations: the linear systems of equations problem and the linear least-square problem. The protocols proposed in this paper achieve acceptable security in the sense of Du-Zhan's paradigm and t-wise collusionresistance, and their communication complexity is O(tm), where t is a security parameter and m is the total number of participants. The complexity of our protocol is significantly better than the previous result O(m 2 lµ) of [4] , in which the oblivious transfer protocol is used as an important building block. .
Introduction
The goal of multi-party computation, as advanced by Yao [1] in 1982, is to enable a set of players to evaluate an arbitrary function on their private inputs. The problem is that the computation must guarantee the correctness of the result while preserving the privacy of the players' inputs. This problem is referred to as the Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMC) problem in [1] . Hypothetically speaking, imagine we have a trusted third party to which all parties give their inputs. The trusted party computes the output and returns it to the parties. The SMC protocol enables this without the trusted third party. The general SMC problem is theoretically solvable by the circuit evaluation method [1, 2, 3] . While this theoretical approach is appealing in its generality and simplicity, the protocols it generated depend on the size of the circuit. This size depends on the size of the input domain, and on the expressional complexity of a computation. Goldreich points out in [3] that using the solutions derived by these general results for special cases of multi-party computation can be impractical. Hence special solutions should be developed for special cases for reasons of efficiency.
Recently, specific SMC problems for various computation domains have been identified and efficient SMC protocols to solve the corresponding problems have been proposed. Those protocols include privacy-preserving cooperative computations for scientific computations [4] , database query [5] , intrusion detection [6] , statistical analysis [7] , geometric computations [8] , and data mining [9] .
However, these solutions, although achieving ideal security, are still not efficient enough for practical uses.
On the other hand, Du and Zhan [10] have proposed a new paradigm, in which they aimed at developing practical solutions to SMC problems and introduced an acceptable security model that allows partial information disclosure. Their conjecture is that by lowering the restriction on the security, they can achieve a much better performance. Du and Zhan [10] have developed a number of techniques under this new paradigm.
In this paper, we propose several practical SMC protocols for privacy-preserving cooperative scientific computations under the Du-Zhan's paradigm. We consider two important scientific computations which involve linear equations: the linear systems of equations and the linear least-squares problems. Du and Atallah [4] have formally defined the privacy-preserving cooperative scientific computation problems of the 2-party model, and presented protocols to solve them. In the Du-Atallah's protocols, the 1-out-of-N oblivious transfer protocol of [11] was used as an important building block. Since all the 1-out-of-N oblivious transfer protocols are still not practical, DuAtallah's protocol, although achieving the ideal security, is also impractical. In fact, we will show that Du-Atallah's 2-party protocol is especially inefficient when we simply extend their protocol to the m-party (m≥ 3) version. Based on this investigation, we present several practical m-party protocols for privacy-preserving cooperative scientific computations.
Practical SMC
Du and Zhan [10] proposed a security paradigm to study the SMC problems based on an acceptable security model. They referred to this problem as the Practical SMC (PSMC) problem. The PSMC problem deals with computing any function on any input, in a distributed network where each party holds one of the inputs, ensuring that only partial information is revealed to a participant in the computation. An informal definition of acceptable security is as follows [10] :
A protocol achieves acceptable security, if an adversary can only narrow down all the possible values of the secret data to a domain with the following properties:
1. The number of values in this domain is infinite, or the number of values in this domain is so large that a brute-force attack is computationally infeasible. 2. The range of the domain is acceptable for the application. The definition of the acceptable range depends on specific applications.
In [10] , the authors designed the Commodity-Server Model to achieve practical security. This model introduces an extra server, the commodity server, belonging to a third party. The only requirement imposed on the commodity server is that it cannot collude with any participants. In this paper we develop some protocols under this computation model. The Commodity-Server has a few appealing properties. First, this server does not participate in the computation between participants, but it does provide data for them to hide their private data. Second, the data provided by the Commodity-Server does not depend on the participants' private data. With these properties, the Commodity-Server can generate independent off-line data, and sell them as commodities to the participants. The Commodity-Server model is depicted in Figure 1 . 
Problem Description
We consider the situations that could usually be modeled as linear systems of equations problems or linear least square problems. These scientific computation problems have shown themselves to be valuable for modeling many types of problems in planning, routing, scheduling, assignment, and design. We assume that there are m parties P 1 , P 2 , … , P m engaged in the computation, where m ≥2, and all parties want to jointly conduct the computations based on the private inputs.
A system of n linear equations in n unknown variables may be written as a single vector equation Ax = b, where A is the n×n coefficient matrix, and x and b are the n×1 column vectors. Assume that each party P j (1≤ j ≤ m) has k j equations as its private information and that k 1 + … + k m = n. Then, Ax = b can be written as (
, where A j and b j (1≤ j ≤ m) are the n×n and n×1 matrices whose entries are all zero except for the k j rows corresponding private information of P j , respectively. The problem of privacy-preserving cooperative multi-party computation for the linear system of equations (PCMC-LSE) is defined as follows.
Definition 1. (PCMC-LSE)
Assume that there are m parties P 1 , P 2 , … , P m (m ≥ 2) engaged in the computation, and that each party P j (1≤ j ≤ m) provides k j (k 1 + … + k m = n) equations as its private input with the corresponding matrices A j and b j , where A j and b j (1≤ j ≤ m) are the n×n and n×1 matrices whose entries are all zero except for the k j rows, respectively. The PCMC-LSE problem is that all parties know the solution x of (A 1 + … + A m ) x = (b 1 + … + b m ) while nobody knows another party's private input.
There are situations where we have more equations to satisfy than the number of unknown variables. Most often we cannot satisfy all of these equations. However we may find a solution that can satisfy them as best as we can. This problem is called the linear least-squares problem. We refer to the privacy-preserving cooperative multi-party computation version for the linear least-squares problem as PCMC-LLS.
Definition 2. (PCMC-LLS)
Assume that there are m parties P 1 , P 2 , … , P m (m ≥ 2) engaged in the computation, and that each party P j (1≤ j ≤ m) provides matrices A j and b j as its private input, where A j and b j (1≤ j ≤ m) are the l × n (l > n) and l×1 matrices whose entries are all zero except for the k j (k 1 + … + k m = l) rows, respectively. The PCMC-LLS problem here is that all parties know the linear leastsquares solution x of (A 1 + … + A m ) x = (b 1 + … + b m ) while nobody knows any other party's private input. The linear least-squares solution x of Ax = b minimizes || bAx || , where || ⋅ || denotes the Euclidean norm.
Practical Privacy-Preserving Cooperative Scientific Computations
In this section, we describe the PCMC-LSE and PCMC-LLS protocols to solve the corresponding problems of Definition 1 and 2, respectively. Firstly, we present a secure split protocol that is used as a building block of the other two protocols. The goal of the secure split protocol is to blind individual shares in such a way that no share reveals private information, but the sum total of all shares remains the same as before. This protocol is a matrix version of Protocol 1 of [12] . Protocol 1. (Secure Split Protocol) Input: Each party P j (1≤ j ≤ m) provides l × n matrix A j as a private input. Output: Each party
All parties jointly agree on a security parameter t, such that 1≤ t ≤ m-1.
The Commodity-Server generates
entries are a sufficiently large random number and
randomly chosen t parties from the remaining m-1 parties. Party P j sets its share of A j to be R 0
4. After receiving t′ matrices from other parties, each party
, where party
From step 4 of Protocol 1, we obtain that ∑ j=1
. By using Protocol 1, we can design a practical protocol to solve the PCMC-LSE problem under the Commodity-Server model.
Protocol 2. (PCMC-LSE Protocol)
Input: Each party P j (1≤ j ≤ m) provides a matrix A j and a column vector b j as its private inputs, where A j and b j (1≤ j ≤ m) are n×n and n×1 matrices whose entries are all zero except for the k j (k 1 + … + k m = n) rows, respectively. Output: Each party P j (1≤ j ≤ m) obtains the solution x of ( We can confirm that the value x of step 5 of Protocol 2 is the solution of (
Now we consider the PCMC-LLS problem of Definition 2. Note that the linear system Ax = b, where A and b are the l × n (l > n) and l×1 matrices, is equivalent to the normal linear system A t Ax = A t b, where A t denotes the transposed matrix of A. Since A t A is an n × n square matrix and A t b is an n-dimensional column vector, the linear least-squares problem can be expressed in the problem of solving the corresponding linear system of n equations. On the basis of this mathematical property, we can design a protocol which solves the PCMC-LLS problem. At step 4 of Protocol 3, the Commodity-Server solves the following linear system of equations:
. Hence we know that the linear least-squares solution of (
Analysis of Security and Complexity
In Protocol 1, the method of hiding data is secure in practice, but not in the information-theoretic sense. A single private input A j is distributed among t+1 parties. When this protocol is used as part of another protocol, the individual shares B j 's are revealed. However, in order for an individual A j to be revealed, all of the t parties to whom party P j sends messages in step 3 of Protocol 1 and all parties who send messages to party P j in step 4 must collude. Therefore, Protocol 1 is collusion-resistant against a threshold adversarial structure that consists of at most t colluders. To clarify this property, we introduce the t-wise collusion-resistance.
Definition 3. (t-wise collusion-resistance) Let t, i, j ∈ {1, … , m}. A multi-party computation protocol guarantees twise collusion-resistance if for any set C ⊂ { P 1 , , … , P m }, where |C| ≤ t , and all c ∈ C can collude together, the members in C cannot obtain any information about the private inputs of the members in { P 1 , , … , P m }-C.
It is easy to show that Protocol 1 guarantees t-wise collusion-resistance. Moreover, we can obtain the following theorem based on the acceptable security of [10] .
Theorem 1.
Assume that all entries of the matrices are generated from the real number domain. Then Protocol 1 is secure such that each P j does not learn any entry of A i , a private input of P i , for any i ≠ j.
Proof. Note that Protocol 1 guarantees t-wise collusionresistance. Fix two parties P j , P i ∈{ P 1 , , … , P m }, such that P j and P i cannot collude. Then R k i ( i) or nothing is all that P j can obtain from P i , and
Therefore, P j cannot find out any entry of A i , because of the randomness and the secrecy of R 0 ( i) .
If the entries of the random matrices are not generated from the real number domain, P j might obtain some information about A i . For example, if the entries of the random matrices are in the domain of some finite interval, then P j can obtain some properties about the entries of A i .
In Protocols 2 and 3, everything that the CommodityServer learns during the execution of protocols are Ê j 's and ĝ j 's. Thus the Commodity-Server does not learn anything about the real solution x, since the server cannot collude with any party and does not know the value of S. Protocol 1 is used as a part of Protocols 2 and 3, so the acceptable security of Protocols 2 and 3 is guaranteed by that of Protocol 1.
Theorem 2.
Assume that all entries of the matrices are generated from the real number domain. Then Protocols 2 and 3 are secure such that each P j does not learn any entry of A i and b i , the private inputs of P i , for any i ≠ j. -t : the security parameter such that 1≤ t ≤ m-1.
Conclusion
We have proposed three practical SMC protocols for privacy-preserving cooperative scientific computations. We have designed a secure split protocol (Protocol 1), and PCMC-LSE (Protocol 2) and PCMC-LLS (Protocol 3) protocols in order to solve the problems of privacypreserving cooperative multi-party computation for the linear system of equations and the linear least-squares. The protocols proposed in this paper achieve acceptable security in the sense of Du-Zhan's paradigm and t-wise collusion-resistance, and their communication complexity is O(tm), where t is a security parameter and m is the total number of participants. This complexity represents a significant improvement on the previous result.
